Robert J. Bunker and Hakim J. Hazim point out an inconvenient truth: self-radicalization is an important domestic facet of the terrorist threat, and ignorance of it in public debate.
For procedural issues, this point is important:
“Specifically, while non-state warfare can be waged by larger radical Islamic cells, i.e. those which have been successfully interdicted such as the 2002 Lackawanna, New York (Muktar al-Bakri et al); 2005 Lodi, California (Hayat family et al); 2007 Fort Dix, New Jersey (Duka family et al); and 2009 New York (Najibullah Zazi et al) groups, it must also ask whether cells composed of ones and twos are not now also part of this threat spectrum. If ignored and simply labeled as ‘other than war (or terrorist)’ incidents, we may find ourselves with a homeland security capability superbly suited to combat large (and more conventional) cells belonging to the radical Islamic network but not the smaller and to date more effective ones. Such roles and missions would thus be deemed outside of current counter-terrorism operations even though they too may become not necessarily the mission US governmental agencies and personnel desire but the one that they end up with.”