WWII Naples as a Feral City

One unfortunate theme running through arguments against US intervention in general is that of “ancient hatreds”–the idea that just because a given Third World state is corrupt, superstitious, and fractured at one point in time it has been that way since the dawn of recorded time and will continue to be so forever. In a review of a Allied intel officer’s World War II memoir of occupied Naples, Kenneth Payne at Kings of War notes the parallels to Iraq and Afghanistan:

“Criminality is rampant – military and medical provisions are lifted straight off the ship, copper wire is no sooner installed than stolen. Pervasive corruption extends to the provisional government, whose officials are deeply complicit in the huge black market. Armed groups patrol the countryside, raiding convoys and villages. Allied soldiers, in this case rapacious Moroccans, are captured by locals, tortured and decapitated. Flagellants march through the streets, beating their bloodied chests. Nascent democracy, imposed by the allies, produces great political fragmentation, extremist ideas, and politicized religion – nuns distribute bread in exchange for votes. Rumour and superstition are rife, as are hunger, disease and poverty.”

So are Italians naturally uncivilized? Anyone with a passing grasp of history gained from watching History Channel, PBS, and National Geographic can tell you otherwise. Furthermore, the US bore some responsibility for the mess through the both accidental and purposeful re-importing of criminal syndicates that Mussolini had largely crushed in his rise to power. We should debate the costs and benefits of stability operations missions, but make extra effort to refrain from the 19th century colonialist idea that peoples living in failed states are unusually rapacious and incapable of governing themselves.

The Trump Card

This is the single most important factor that none of the NGOs villifying China for its non-response to the Burma crackdown actually considered:

“While the [Chinese Navy] may be able to contest control of its immediate coastal waters, its capabilities fall off rapidly with distance. If the United States wanted tomorrow to constrict China’s maritime access to oil, minerals and markets, there would be very little Beijing could do in direct response. Chinese strategists are acutely aware of this potential vulnerability and they are hard at work on a variety of projects which, taken together, may help to mitigate the danger. Included among these are: a strategic petroleum reserve; transcontinental pipelines to Russia and Central Asia; the pursuit of undersea resources close to China’s coasts; new transportation routes through Southeast Asia that would permit oil and gas from the Middle East to bypass the narrow straits off Indonesia; the construction of ports and airfields in Myanmar and Pakistan that could be used in an emergency by a future Chinese air and naval ‘rapid-deployment force’; a deepening strategic relationship with Iran that could provide a bridgehead to the Persian Gulf; and the development of aircraft carriers and long-range nuclear-powered attack submarines, and the construction of large numbers of diesel subs, which will give the PLAN some capacity to defend China’s sea-lanes and perhaps to attack the shipping of its rivals..”

The Chinese are trying to outflank us through Burma, which they would be dumb if they did not consider at one point in time. Geopolitics and geostrategy’s utility has been overrated both as a method of strategy and a method of analysis, but analysts should not discount it entirely in explaining the behavior of great powers.

It’s a Trap!

Abu Muquwama’s Marine Corps cousin asks a somewhat offbeat question:

“Why didn’t the Rebel Alliance pursue a strategy of insurgency in their rebellion against the Galactic Empire? I would argue that they pursued a strategy of conventional war against the Empire and forwent every aspect of insurgent strategy and tactics. They finally came around a bit in the end by co-opting the Ewoks onto their side. Why hadn’t they pursued that strategy on a larger scale? Instead, they simply staged two conventional assualts on the Empire’s center of gravity: the Death Star.  Although both attempts were successful, I think they got lucky. I think they would have been better served had read their Mao and followed his maxims. Why didn’t the Empire follow counterinsurgency doctrine? Destroying Alderan was probably the dumbest move ever, one that the Alliance could have exploited to their advantage with the proper IO campaign. “

The analysis here does not really deal at all with the political context established in the films and Star Wars expanded universe. Instead, there’s merely a discussion of operations and tactics. Classical insurgency and and population-centric counterinsurgency are just automatically assumed to be the best uses of force that both parties can employ.

Learning from Mumbai Part 2

Anyone with a subscription to Journal of Information Warfare should check out Chris Flaherty’s essay “2D vs. 3D Tactical Supremacy in Urban Operations.” Flaherty critiques and expands on the framework John P. Sullivan and I developed in “Postcard from Mumbai” and introduces his own highly original concept of urban defense.

Complexity in National Defense

New piece in Small Wars Journal on complexity in foreign affairs and strategy. Challenges some popular assumptions about post-Cold War world.

Open Spaces and Systems

I missed this one, but Curtis flags an interesting initiative going on with P2P thinking.

State Change and Sri Lankan COIN

Two posts on the state change debate and the relevance of the Sri Lankan COIN model at RTJ .

Triumph of the Old Media?

Peter Daou, a leading online strategist and former adviser to Hillary Clinton has a rather fascinating post on the current health care debate that pertains to some of the discussions about social media and information strategy examined here over the last few months:

“[M]y fellow digerati: it’s time to admit that the communications landscape, at least in politics, isn’t necessarily tilted in favor of new media. The health reform showdown is powerful evidence that the much-touted online advantage of the left, if not a chimera, is certainly questionable when it comes to major political confrontations. …It’s been fashionable in tech/political circles to think of the Internet as an establishment-slayer that destroys business models and shakes up the political landscape and to consider 2008 a watershed for citizen empowerment, but the more sober scenario is one where the establishment stops the bleeding, stabilizes, and reasserts its capacity to shape public perceptions. The health care battle bolsters the latter case.”

Why is this so? Dauo argues that the “establishment” has co-opted social media, established hybrid forms of media (such as Politico), and that old forms of media such as cable news still set the agenda. Let’s put aside Daou’s simplistic “rebels vs. establishment” binary (a myth and a rhetorical device that the netroots propate) for a second and unpack the meaning of this essay.

What Dauo is essentially stating is that it is difficult to transform “online power” (tweets, blogs, facebook profiles, etc) into political power. Curtis Gale Weeks explained why earlier in an analysis of the Iranian Twitter uprising. While the greening of thousands of Twitter profiles may seem like the mobilization of a movement, Weeks argues argues that it is in fact “the sound of multiple people clapping one hand in the effort to increase the volume of their outrage.” The self-multiplication effect makes it difficult for one to objectively assess the amount of power he or she can employ at one point in time.

Second, while it may be fashionable to bash centralized and hierarchal organizations, they have a number of important advantages. They have their heft and power, and a “topsight” that gives their efforts strategic coherence. And they can enable their lower elements to move with a surprisingly flexible articulation. Citing German “mission tactics” has by now become something of a cliche in strategic studies, but I think people keep coming back to it simply because the example is so basic and powerful.

People who consider themselves “insurgents” often vastly overestimate their ability to keep their opponents off balance. They imagine their opponent as a kind of shapeless mass that can’t fight back, or is supposed to be bowled over by superior technology. They severely underestimate the opponent’s ability to adapt and use both old and new tools.

“Divine Justice” in Mexico

Sam Logan and John P. Sullivan have a new article in ISN on La Familia that chronicles the group's emergence and impact on the Mexican security situation:

"Mexican analysts believe that La Familia formed in the 1980s with the stated purpose of bringing order to Michoacan, emphasizing help and protection for the poor. In its initial incarnation, La Familia formed as a group of vigilantes, spurred to power to counter interloping kidnappers and drug dealers, who were their stated enemies. Since then, La Familia has capitalized on its reputation, building its myth, power and reach to transition into a criminal gang itself. While doing so, it has become a powerful regional polydrug organization with its fingers in methamphetamine, marijuana and cocaine trafficking; kidnapping for ransom; and pirated CDs and DVDs – not to mention co-opting politicians and seizing political control and influence."

La Familia is a good example of what happens to ideological groups in drug conflicts. La Familia, like the FARC, is essentially a giant gang now with little linkage to the views it once espoused. That is also why vigilante groups in Mexico are not a sign of the end of cartel terror. Al they signify is another player entering the stage.

Hakim Hazim has a useful post in GroupIntel looking at the impact of micro movements like La Familia with potentially macro impact. This is the reality of strategic compression. And he is right to classify La Familia as a radical grouping, comparing them to Hamas:

"La Familia’s propaganda extends into the realm of faith. One could argue that it is a religious movement as well. The cartel’s spiritual leader, Nazario “The Maddest One” Moreno, has solidified his status as the people’s preacher. He has produced a gospel of self-help for downtrodden supporters, justified violence for its active members, and evangelical zeal and slogans to maintain a sense of familiarity with the larger faith. La Famalia spreads its messages of hope, salvation and divine justice through various media outlets. In addition they have given gifts to the poor and employ a large number of people at ten times the national average (nearly $2000 a month). By providing things the state has not: services, money, religious identity and social mobility within the group, La Familia is winning big political points in the guise of religion. The pattern is not much different from that of Hamas, Hezbollah or many other terror networks that work to secure the favor of the people and have a religious ideology as a cover for their action. Radical networks are evolving and increasing their efforts to win the hearts and minds of the people. The cartels are operating without constraint as a law unto themselves."

Social Media is Mainstream in Politics

Bill Petti makes some good points here that echo my comments on UH. The most important thing he notes is quite simple: both parties are using social media now. You have everyone from Karl Rove to Dennis Kucinich on Twitter now. Sarah Palin is on Facebook. It’s never about the technology itself but how you use it. Just because you and your buddies have a Twitter doesn’t give you an advantage over the next man. I’m sick and tired of seeing “get online, get linked like those new kids” being taken as sage advice.

There needs to be more thinking about how these technologies are actually used and the overriding framework that they will fit into. That’s why companies like Strategic Social are doing valuable intellectual and practical work. Check out this excellent post by Matt Tirman about social media and national security, for example, in which he states what many people refuse to accept is now obvious: “picks and shovels are NOT strategy.”